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Although sweeping statements about the effect of television viewing on
political participation could still be found in the literature in the 1990s, it is
now commonly held that the effect of television should be studied as a multi-
dimensional phenomenon. Not only the time spent watching television but
also the kinds of programs being watched and even the preference for parti-
cular stations are assumed to have an effect. In this article, we report on a sur-
vey among 6,330 Belgian adolescents allowing for a comprehensive analysis of
the relationship between various dimensions of television viewing and political
participation. We focus on adolescents, because research suggests that the
decline in participation levels clearly manifests itself in this age group. The
results of the analysis confirm a negative impact of the amount of television
viewing, which is partly counterbalanced by a positive impact of a preference
for information and for public broadcasting. We discuss the implications of
these findings among adolescents for adult participation behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
The impact of television on political participation has been a matter of
recurrent concern within communication research. During the 1990s, this
debate was still conducted in very broad terms, with various publications
depicting a stereotypical view of a new generation of ‘‘couch potatoes’’
(Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Patterson, 1993; Postman, 1985; Putnam,
2000). In subsequent research, however, this gloomy picture has been greatly
modified. The uses and gratification approach suggests that audiences
actively select the media content they are exposed to, which implies that
rather than expecting general media effects, attention should be focused
on specific media contents (Vincent & Basil, 1997). The available research
results are indeed far from conclusive.
First, the negative relationship between the amount of time television
viewing and political participation levels has not been confirmed by all
available studies, and a number of authors even detect a positive relation-
ship between participation levels and certain types of programs (Hoffman &
Thomson, 2009; Livingstone & Markham, 2008).
Second, a number of authors have also argued that the effects of tele-
vision are dependent on various dimensions of the phenomenon (Moy,
McCluskey, McCoy, & Spratt, 2004; Pasek, Kenski, Romer, & Jamieson,
2006). Within the uses and gratifications approach, researchers have intro-
duced a distinction between the entertainment and information function
of television use (Rubin, 1983). Building on this distinction, Prior (2005,
2007) argued that the entertainment use of television is negatively associated
with political knowledge and political participation, whereas the opposite
relationship is observed for the information function of television. This uses
and gratifications approach toward the study of television effects has gained
salience as a result of the emergence of high-choice media environments.
Given that the choices available to media consumers have multiplied during
the past decades, it can be assumed that the differentiation of television
effects has increased accordingly (Prior, 2007). The range of media options
available allows viewers to make an effective selection, resulting in a closer
fit between their prior motivations and their actual viewing behavior.
Third, not just the types of programs being watched can be expected to
differentiate television effects, but the different broadcast stations too may
cultivate specific political orientations, as their aim is to encourage station
loyalty among potential viewers. The habit of watching specific channels
could therefore be related to specific value orientations among a particular
group, even controlling for program content (Mendelsohn & Nadeau, 1996).
Television networks try to promote brand loyalty among their viewers,
which might lead to the development of habitual viewing behaviors among
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specific audience groups (Eastman & Ferguson, 1997). In various European
countries with a strong public broadcasting tradition, differences have been
documented between the relative effects of regularly viewing public or com-
mercial broadcasting (Holtz-Bacha & Norris, 2001; Jenssen, 2009;
Schmitt-Beck, 2008).
What is missing thus far in the literature is a comprehensive account of
these various dimensions of television effects: If we simultaneously consider
the time spent on television, the types of programs watched, and the prefer-
ences for specific channels, what is the overall picture that emerges? Does
the inclusion of a measure for viewers’ preference for entertainment imply
that television viewing as such (as a general measure) no longer has a signifi-
cant effect on participation levels? In the current high-choice media environ-
ment, we should no longer expect the occurrence of general media effects,
but we should focus on content-specific and station-specific effects, as audi-
ences expose themselves to specific media contents. The process of ‘‘interest
maximation’’ allows viewers to achieve a close fit between their preferences
and actual viewing behavior (Jeffres, 1978).
In this article, we develop a comprehensive account of the effects of vari-
ous dimensions of television viewing behavior on political participation by
analyzing data from a representative sample of adolescents in Belgium.
Our contribution to the debate lies in the simultaneous inclusion of all the-
oretically relevant variables, which allows us to assess whether it makes
sense to distinguish between these various components of television viewing.
We focus on adolescents because media effects can be expected to be stron-
ger in this age group than among adult audiences (Arnett, 1995). Further-
more, various studies have shown that the decline of participation levels
in Western democracies is concentrated among younger age cohorts
(Kimberlee, 2002; Li & Marsh, 2008; O’Toole, Lister, Marsh, Jones, &
McDonagh, 2003; Wattenberg, 2007). Belgium offers a good case study
because of the strong presence of a public broadcasting system,1 allowing
us to distinguish between the effects of commercial and public broadcasting
(Jenssen, 2009).
In the remainder of this article we briefly review the literature on the
relationship between television viewing and political participation. The
review of the literature is structured on the three major issues we dis-
tinguished: time, programs, and channels. Next, we present the data, meth-
ods, and the operationalization of the variables. The results of a regression
1Both in the Dutch-speaking and the French-speaking community of the country, the two
public broadcasting corporations (VRT and RTBF, respectively) enjoy a solid market share,
although this is larger in the Dutch community than in the French community.
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analysis are then presented, followed by discussion of the relevance of these
findings.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Time Effects
Concern about the alleged negative impact of television on political partici-
pation is certainly not a new phenomenon (Moy, Scheufele, & Holbert,
1999; Putnam, 2000). The main claim in this line of research was that the
increasing amount of time spent on television viewing and other media
reduces the time available for participation. The negative relationship
between the time spent in front of the television and the time spent on par-
ticipation has often been considered as a time-replacement effect: It was
taken that the time that is now being spent in front of the television set is
no longer available for social activities, although it should be noted that
other causal mechanisms might be involved as well. Thus, television viewing
may be associated with a lack of mental and behavioral involvement in the
local community. Heavy television viewers, it has been claimed, have a
weaker sense of belonging to a specific community and feel less efficacious
in changing living conditions within their group (Uslaner, 1998).
Program Preferences
Markus Prior (2005, 2007), in particular, has argued that these general and
sweeping statements about the effect of television might have become obsol-
ete. In recent decades, the television market has changed dramatically, offer-
ing viewers a growing array of options. As Prior (2005) argued, this might
imply that some earlier findings about television and political participation
are no longer valid:
As media choice increases, content preferences thus become the key to under-
standing political learning and participation. In a high-choice environment,
politics constantly competes with entertainment. Until recently, the impact
of content preferences was limited because media users did not enjoy much
choice between different content. (p. 577)
In the past, this limited choice meant that viewers were not always able to
self-select exposure to specific types of programming. Due to programming
practices, even viewers interested in sitcoms were almost inevitably exposed
to news and current affairs programs. In the current high-choice media
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environment, however, choice and self-selection play a much greater role,
allowing viewers to select specific forms of media content to a much greater
extent than was the case when the uses and gratifications approach was first
developed in the literature. In his own study, Prior (2007, p. 35) demon-
strated that, whereas in a low-choice television environment some 80% of
all viewers watch at least some news broadcast items, this is only 42% in
a high-choice environment. Not only have broadcasters fine-tuned their pro-
gramming strategies, serving specific niche audiences, but most households
now also have access to many more channels than ever before (Chaffee &
Frank, 1996). In a ‘‘high-choice media environment,’’ viewers can easily
avoid political information, and therefore the least interested are the most
likely to avoid political programs. This evolution makes it even more
unlikely that general media effects will be found, as various audience seg-
ments can and do have totally different television viewing preferences and
motivations (Ruggiero, 2000).
Some earlier studies have already demonstrated that the use of television
for either entertainment or information may lead to widely divergent out-
comes with regard to political participation. Not differentiating between
both preferences entails the risk of opposing effects canceling each other
out, leading to a nonconclusion. In most of the literature, it has indeed been
demonstrated that the use of mass media for information is associated with
higher levels of participation, whereas the opposite is true for the entertain-
ment use (Holtz-Bacha, 1990; Y. M. Kim & Vishak, 2008; Putnam, 2000;
Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001; Zhang & Chia, 2006). Newton (1999) argued
that watching films leads to a decreased level of political knowledge and
political interest. Hooghe (2002) similarly concluded that movies and soaps
(i.e., entertainment programs) do not have an effect on political efficacy. On
the other hand, Norris and other authors found that watching television
news raises the level of political knowledge, civic and political participation,
interest, social trust, and efficacy (Ho et al., 2011; E. Kim, Scheufele, &
Han, 2011; Norris, 1996, 2000a, 2000b; Shah, McLeod, & Yoon, 2001;
Zhang & Chia, 2006). Newton (1999) confirmed that watching television
news increased political knowledge, political interest, and the feeling that
democracy works. In line with these findings, Prior (2007) demonstrated
that watching television news is associated with greater political knowledge,
interest, and higher voter turnout, especially among the less educated. Jung,
Kim, and Homero (2011), finally, have shown that the use of news media
spurs political participation, and this positive effect is mediated by political
discussion, online political messaging, political knowledge, and efficacy.
In other research, it has been shown that some programs are more likely
to induce a perception of a ‘‘mean world’’ than others (Uslaner, 1998).
Reality programs, for instance, are associated with social mistrust and civic
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disengagement (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, & Signorielli, 1980; Shah,
McLeod, & Yoon, 2001).
Television Stations
Not only program preferences, however, but also the choice of specific tele-
vision stations may have a mitigating effect. The types of studies just men-
tioned have mainly been conducted in a European context, where public
broadcasting accounts for a large share of the total audience. Findings sug-
gest that a preference for public broadcasting is associated with higher levels
of political knowledge and political efficacy, whereas the opposite is true for
watching commercial stations (Blumler&Hoffmann-Riem,1992;DeVreese&
Boomgaarden, 2006; Holtz-Bacha & Norris, 2001). Other authors, however,
are much more skeptical about the question whether viewers tend to stick to
one channel or just browse channels (Morris & Forgette, 2007). On the pre-
cise reason for the occurrence of these opposite effects, however, opinions
continue to differ (Aarts & Semetko, 2003). Some authors argue that com-
mercial television is likely to be associated with lower quality programming,
as investment is driven by market imperatives (Holtz-Bacha & Norris, 2001;
Milner, 2005). It can also be assumed that commercial stations will devote
less airtime to information programs than public broadcast stations do,
but even controlling for program content, the effect of the station itself
seems to remain significant in some of the available research (Aarts &
Semetko, 2003; Hooghe, 2002).
Goal of the Study
It is important to disentangle the various dimensions of television-viewing
behavior, as this may provide more specific clues about the underlying cau-
sal mechanisms. If time was found to be the most important element, some
form of time-replacement effect might be at work. If programs or program
preferences proved to be of paramount importance, it would be obvious that
selective exposure and program content might play a role. Finally, if station
preferences are found to be important, some form of group processes,
habits, and cultivation might seem an obvious focus for future research.
Correct assessment of the various dimensions of television viewing is there-
fore crucial, which implies that all these elements must be included in one
multivariate model.
Although concern about the impact of television on political partici-
pation is quite general, and can be applied to the television audience as a
whole, younger age cohorts receive special attention in this line of study.
As Pasek et al. (2006) showed, political participation levels are typically very
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low for this age group, and young people score poorly on various indicators
of political participation. Simultaneously, we also know that media con-
sumption tends to be quite high for this age group (Arnett, 1995; Living-
stone, 2002; Morris & Forgette, 2007). As young people have had fewer
previous socialization experiences, media effects can be expected to be
strongest among this age group (Livingstone, 2002). Austin, Van de Vord,
Pinkleton, and Epstein (2008) have shown that celebrity-endorsed, get-out-
the-vote campaigns are associated with higher levels of political efficacy
among young voters. Studying youth participation patterns is also impor-
tant because previous research has established that participation is a habit
that is picked up quite early in the life cycle. Individuals already active dur-
ing adolescence are more likely to continue this practice throughout the life
cycle (Jennings & Stoker, 2004). This makes it all the more relevant to study
engagement patterns at an early age.
In this article, we focus on the effect of selective exposure in the current
high-choice television environment on the political participation habits of
late adolescents. Self-evidently, the Internet is rapidly becoming the pre-
ferred communication channel of adolescents (Quintelier & Vissers, 2008)
and probably will overtake television as the main source of information
about the outside world in the near future. For the time being, however, tele-
vision remains a very important, if not the main, mass communication tool
for adolescents (Hoffman & Thomson, 2009, p. 6).
HYPOTHESES
Given the findings in the research literature, one can expect a negative
relationship between the time spent watching television and levels of
political participation (H1). Second (H2), it is hypothesized that a prefer-
ence for entertainment programs is associated with low participation
levels, whereas this is not the case for information programs. The third
hypothesis (H3) suggests that public television has a more positive effect
on political engagement than commercial stations. Unlike the previous
literature, this article aims to incorporate all three dimensions of tele-
vision viewing simultaneously, thus allowing for proper assessment of
the three hypotheses.
DATA AND METHODS
These hypotheses are tested using the results of the Belgian Youth Survey
2006 (BYS 2006), which was conducted among 6,330 fifteen- and
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sixteen-year-olds in Belgium. A response analysis showed that the survey
results are representative for 16-year-olds in Belgium, with no significant
differences with regard to gender, region, language, ethnic origin, edu-
cation level, and school track. Because schooling is compulsory until the
age of 18 in Belgium, this means that the sample is also representative
for the entire population of 16-year-old adolescents (Hooghe, Quintelier,
Claes, & Dejaeghere, 2006). Based on written questionnaires completed
by the respondents in 112 schools, the study focuses on young people’s
social and political attitudes and contains questions about how much time
they spend watching television, what kinds of programs they watch, and
which channels they prefer. As such, this data set is ideally suited to test
the three hypotheses.
It should also be noted that Belgian legislation does not require prior
written consent from the parents for this kind of research, which renders
it easier to obtain a representative sample of adolescents. In countries
requiring prior written parental consent, on the other hand, response rates
among adolescents can be as low as 3.2% (Hoffman & Thomson, 2009,
p. 11). The high response rate renders it more likely that the answers
obtained in this survey are indeed representative for this age group in
Belgium. In the following paragraphs, we first present the most important
variables in the analysis.
Television Viewing
If we want to ascertain the effects of various components of
television-watching behavior, it is crucial that all of them are
adequately measured (Prior, 2009a, 2009b). Hence, the questionnaire
included elaborate measurements of television viewing. First, respon-
dents were asked about the time they spent watching television. Answer
options ranged from (a) never watch television, (b) watch less than 1
hour, (c) 1 to 2 hours, (d) 3 to 4 hours, to (e) 5 and more hours per
day. Second, entertainment and information preferences were measured.
This was done by presenting respondents with a list of 12 types of tele-
vision programs from which they could select up to 3 favorite pro-
grams: music videos, reality TV, cartoons, movies, youth programs,
soaps, talk shows, news and current events, game shows, programs
about their community, lifestyle programs, or sports programs. The
answers were used to construct entertainment and information prefer-
ences scales (see next). Third, respondents were presented with a list
of 18 different television stations that are offered on most local cable
networks in the country. Again, respondents could select up to three
favorite networks.
TELEVISION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 627
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [K
.U
.L
eu
ve
n -
 T
ijd
sch
rif
ten
] a
t 1
1:1
6 0
9 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
1 
Political Participation
The dependent variable in the analysis is political participation: To what
extent do adolescents participate in the political life of their communities?
We rely on the standard definition of political participation as any act that
is performed with intention of transmitting information about social prefer-
ences and issues to political decision makers and exerting pressure on these
decision makers to pay attention to the demands being voiced (Milbrath,
1965; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Verba & Nie, 1972; Verba, Schlozman,
& Brady, 1995). Within normative political theory, there is a general consen-
sus that political participation is an important element of a democratic polit-
ical culture (Dalton, 2005). In total, respondents were presented with 10
different activities that they could have participated in during the previous
12 months, ranging from boycotting products for political or ethical reasons
to forwarding e-mails with political content and the frequency of those activi-
ties was recorded (never, a few times, often; see Table 1 for question topics).
It has to be noted that voting—the most common political participation
act—is not included in this list, as 16-year-olds do not have the right to vote
in Belgium. Within the literature on youth participation, it is customary to
make a distinction between a more narrow definition of participation, tied
to the functioning of political institutions on one hand, and more
TABLE 1
Factor Analysis of Political Participation Acts
Political participation acts
Political
engagement
Political
consumerism
Social movement
engagement
Contacting politicians 0.651 0.050 0.021
Displaying messages 0.611 0.191 0.121
Being a member of a political party 0.578 0.202 0.003
Forwarding political emails 0.544 0.174 0.002
Attending a show with political content 0.417 0.010 0.229
Boycotting 0.013 0.844 0.015
Buycotting 0.010 0.840 0.018
Donating=collecting money 0.186 0.088 0.740
Signing petitions 0.051 0.048 0.664
Protesting 0.184 0.113 0.604
Eigenvalues 2.438 1.183 1.067
Explained variance 24.384 11.834 10.666
Note. Principal component analysis, Promax rotation with Kaiser normalization. Bold repre-
sents factor loading greater than 0.40. Source: Belgian Youth Survey 2006 (Hooghe et al., 2006),
n¼ 6,330.
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social-movement-oriented forms of engagement, on the other hand (Hess &
Torney, 1967; Milbrath, 1965; Torney-Purta, Barber, & Richardson, 2004).2
Other authors have argued that political consumerism should be regarded as
a distinct form of engagement that furthermore is accessible to this age group
(Stolle, Hooghe, & Micheletti, 2005). It is important to make the distinction
between these three forms of participation, because a number of studies sug-
gest that the decline in institutional political participation among young age
groups does not seem to affect social movement-oriented forms of engage-
ment (Zukin et al., 2006). These theoretical distinctions are also included
in the factor analysis based on the 10 participation items.
Table 1 presents the results of a factor analysis of the data. Promax
rotation has been used as this technique allows for correlated (oblique)
dimensions that are typically found in participation behavior (Verba &
Nie, 1972). As Milbrath (1965) and others have shown, political partici-
pation is highly cumulative: People who engage in one form of political
participation (e.g., voting) are also more likely to engage in other forms
(e.g., party membership). Together, these items clearly refer to the standard
definition of political participation, but the different components are in line
with the expectations generated by the theoretical literature. The first factor
consists of actions such as contacting politicians, displaying messages, and
being a member of a political party. Although this factor is clearly related
to institutional politics, it is not clear whether all the items loading on this
factor unequivocally refer to institutional participation, and therefore we
have labeled this first factor ‘‘political engagement’’ (to distinguish it from
the overall battery of ‘‘political participation,’’ including all 10 items). The
second factor includes elements of ‘‘political consumerism,’’ such as deliber-
ately buying or boycotting products and services for political or ethical rea-
sons. The third ‘‘social-movement-engagement’’ factor contains activities
such as donating money, signing a petition, and protesting, which the litera-
ture suggests are usually undertaken outside the context of institutionalized
politics (Torney-Purta et al., 2004).
Control Variables
It can be expected that both the dependent and the independent variables in
this analysis will be influenced by various background characteristics of the
respondents, which are therefore included as control variables (Parry,
2Torney-Purta et al. (2001) provided a strong case for including these social
movement-oriented acts in a definition of political participation, as these clearly aim to change
social conditions. As this issue is beyond the scope of this article, we simply note that we follow
the approach taken by Torney-Purta et al. (2001).
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Moyser, & Day, 1992; Verba et al., 1995). First, there is a strong relation
between socioeconomic status and television watching (Larson, 2001;
Newton, 1999). Operationalizing socioeconomic status among adolescents,
however, is not a straightforward task, as many adolescents cannot provide
a reliable estimate of their parents’ income level, and sometimes not even of
their education level or their exact professional status. In line with previous
research on adolescents, we opted for a combination of two proxy variables
(Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, & Schulz, 2001). On one hand, respon-
dents could indicate how long they intend to pursue further education.
The assumption here is that the expectation of pursuing higher education
not only reflects academic capabilities but also serves as a proxy variable
for the socioeconomic status of the family of origin. On the other hand,
we included information on the number of books at home, a question that
is routinely used in the leading international youth surveys as a proxy vari-
able for the family’s educational level and socioeconomic background (e.g.,
Fuchs & Wo¨ßmann, 2007). In the Belgian context, this assessment can still
be assumed to reflect a form of cultural capital in the parental household.
Both indicators correlate with one another (r¼ .260, p< .001), and therefore
they could be combined in one factor score. Gender is an obvious control
variable, as it has an effect on both engagement levels and television viewing
(Larson, 2001). Citizenship status was taken into account, as some forms of
participation are not easily accessible to those who do not have Belgian
nationality (as was the case for 6.3% of the sample). Political interest
increases the likelihood of watching information programs on television
and of being politically engaged (Prior, 2007, p. 26; Zukin et al., 2006).
A standard political interest question (range¼ 1–4) was therefore included
in the questionnaire. Political knowledge, too, could serve as a mediating fac-
tor, as this can be viewed as a prerequisite for a number of forms of engage-
ment (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). Knowledge was measured by including
four specific questions on politics3 and by adding the correct scores.
Method
Because the dependent variables in this analysis are continuous, ordinary least
square multivariate regression techniques were called for. The three forms of
engagement were used as dependent variables, whereas three types of tele-
vision watching behavior (time, programs, and stations) serve as independent
3Questions included, ‘‘Who is the president of the European Commission?’’ (Jose´ Manuel
Barosso); ‘‘What parts does the Belgian federal parliament consist of?’’ (Chamber and Senate);
‘‘Who is the minister of Justice?’’ (Laurette Onkelinx); ‘‘To which party does Guy Verhofstadt
belong?’’ (VLD). Scores of 0¼ 40.9%, 1¼ 29.2%, 2¼ 16.2%, 3¼ 9.6%, and 4¼ 4.1%.
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variables. Given the construction of our theoretical model, we use a stepwise
regression model, first including time spent on viewing television, adding sub-
sequently the program preference and in a third step the station being pre-
ferred. The rise in explained variance for the three models allows us to
ascertain whether including these variables indeed contributes to our under-
standing of the relation between television and political participation acts.
The Belgian Case
The data set offers representative information about Belgian adolescents.
The Belgian case is particularly apt for the purposes of this study, as the
information function of television still plays a prominent role in Belgium.
The percentage of people watching the evening news has grown over the last
10 years: In 1997, about 20% of Belgian citizens watched the news every
evening, and by 2007 this figure had risen to 23.6% (Aalberg, Van Aelst, &
Curran, 2010). Belgium is also a very densely populated country, and since
the 1970s, cable television has been available to more than 90% of the
population, which partly explains why the use of satellite television remains
limited and is heavily concentrated among ethnic minorities. For research
purposes, this means we know that a vast majority of viewers use cable,
which makes it easier to compile a comprehensive list of the programs
and channels available to the respondents.
RESULTS
Watching Television
A first observation is that adolescents in Belgium spend a substantial
amount of time watching television. Despite the rise in Internet use, tele-
vision is apparently still an essential component of Belgian adolescents’ lei-
sure activities (Table 2). Just over one third of all respondents report they
spend 3 hours a day or more watching television. Television use is almost
universal, with only 2% of respondents indicating that they never watch tele-
vision. Dutch-speaking respondents and boys tend to watch more television
than their French-speaking and female counterparts.
Time Effects
H1 to be tested is whether spending more time watching television is asso-
ciated with lower levels of political participation. To allow comparison of
the effects of the various television measures, the analyses for the different
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hypotheses are performed stepwise. In a first step we just enter time, fol-
lowed by program preference in Step 2, and channel preference in Step 3.
There is a negative significant effect (Table 3) between the time spent watch-
ing television and political consumerism and social movement engagement.
For political engagement, the relation is not significant. Self-evidently, the
observed relation between time and participation levels does not yet reveal
the causal mechanism involved. Time replacement might be an obvious
mechanism, but other attitudinal effects of heavy television viewing might
play a role as well. With regard to the other variables, this analysis does
not reveal many surprises. Political engagement is more common among
those with high political interest and high levels of political knowledge,
and boys outperform girls in this respect. For political consumerism, the
gender balance is reversed, which is in line with the expectations derived
from the literature. In addition, political interest and socioeconomic status
have the strongest impact on the likelihood of using political consumerism
as a form of participation, but some other control variables too remain sig-
nificant. Social movement engagement, finally, is best predicted by gender
(more girls than boys), political interest and socioeconomic status. It has
to be noted that this model is most successful with an explained variance
of 10.8%.
Program Preferences
H2 assumes that entertainment programs will have a negative effect on
engagement. As can be seen from Table 4, entertainment programs are most
popular among the adolescent respondents, particularly movies, music pro-
grams, and sports programs. Only 10% of respondents, on the other hand,
TABLE 2
Time Spent Watching Television on an Average Weekday
% Girls Boys
French
speaking
Dutch
speaking
Never 2.1 1.9 2.3 3.0 1.4
<1 hour 17.1 17.4 16.8 22.0 13.0
1–2 hours 44.5 45.6 43.6 45.6 43.6
3–4 hours 26.0 25.7 26.2 21.9 29.4
5 hours 10.3 9.4 11.1 7.5 12.7
M score 3.25 3.23 3.27 3.09 3.39
Total 6,286 3,358 3,332 2,853 3,433
Note. Entries are column percentages. Self-reported time spent watching television. Source:
Belgian Youth Survey 2006 (Hooghe et al., 2006), n¼ 6,330.
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TABLE 4
Program Preferences
Preference Program %
Entertainment preference Movies 80.0
Music videos 54.8
Sports programs 27.1
Soap operas 24.0
Cartoons 18.1
Youth programs 16.5
Reality TV 12.5
Game shows 11.8
Lifestyle programs 10.7
News preference News and current events 10.4
Other programs (mixed content) Talk shows 5.7
Community shows 1.1
Note. Each respondent could indicate three types, so total % is larger than 100.
The ‘‘other’’ program preferences do not load on one of the two dimensions.
Source: Belgian Youth Survey 2006 (Hooghe et al., 2006).
TABLE 3
Television and Political Participation
Political
engagement
Political
consumerism
Social movement
engagement
b DR2 b DR2 b DR2
Step 1 0.061 0.084 0.108
Gender 0.061 0.080 0.135
Citizenship status 0.013, ns 0.026 0.003, ns
Socioeconomic status 0.006, ns 0.110 0.170
Time spent watching
television
0.022, ns 0.063 0.075
Political knowledge 0.071 0.059 0.075
Political interest 0.201 0.182 0.137
Step 2 0.012 0.005 0.005
Entertainment preference 0.021, ns 0.025, ns 0.023, ns
News preference 0.103 0.067 0.058
Step 3 0.003 0.004 0.002
Public television 0.025, ns 0.062 0.006, ns
Commercial channels 0.051 0.023, ns 0.037
Adjusted R2 0.074 0.092 0.113
F value 44.710 55.957 70.712
Note. Hierachical ordinary least squares regression. Entries are standardized coefficients and
explained variance (for Steps 2 and 3: rise in explained variance). Source: Belgian Youth Survey
2006 (Hooghe et al., 2006).
p< .05. p< .01. p< .001.
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report a preference for news and current affairs programs. Although in itself
a sobering consideration, this is also is a positive indicator of the quality of
the responses. Whereas adult respondents systematically overestimate their
preference for news broadcasts (Prior, 2009a), this seems less the case among
adolescents. In reducing the scale of this information about program, we fol-
lowed the method used by Prior (2007) by building an Entertainment Pref-
erence scale. Preferences for movies, music videos, sports programs, soap
operas, cartoons, youth programs, reality TV, game shows, and lifestyle
programs all loaded clearly on this scale. With these items a simple sum
scale was constructing by adding the entertainment programs they preferred
(up to three). A factor analysis of respondents’ program preferences indi-
cated that talk shows and local community shows did not load on this
Entertainment Preference scale. This is not surprising, as such shows may
contain both news and entertainment-related content. Neither, however,
were they sufficiently correlated with a preference for news and current
affairs, and therefore they were left out of the analysis. Aarts and Semetko
(2003) succeeded in constructing one continuous scale, with entertainment
preference and news preference as the two extremes. In the current data
set, however, we encountered two different dimensions that could not be
combined in one measure. Hence, two distinct dimensions had to be
included, that is, an entertainment preference and a preference for news
and current affairs. Both preferences could be summarized in a dummy vari-
able (0¼ no preference; 1¼ reference).
If both preferences are subsequently included in the analysis (Step 2 in
Table 3), the results partly confirm H2: There is a clear and significant posi-
tive relationship between a news preference and all three forms of political
participation. Watching news and current affairs programs clearly boosts
participation levels, and this effect remains significant, even after controlling
for political interest and political knowledge (Table 3). Entertainment pref-
erence, on the other hand, does not have significant effects on any of the
three types of participation.4 It has to be noted that including program pre-
ferences in the analysis does not substantially increase the explained vari-
ance of the models (although the difference is significant at the level of
.001). Including the second step has the strongest effect on explained vari-
ance of the model for political engagement. The effect of television time
and the control variables remains largely unchanged compared to the results
reported in the first analysis (Step 1).
4Various other operationalizations of the entertainment preference scale have been tested,
but none led to significant results in this analysis (results are available from the author).
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Stations
With regard to the distinction between public and commercial broadcasting,
Belgium can be considered a typical European country, with a strong tra-
dition of public broadcasting (Bardoel & d’Haenens, 2008). It has to be
remembered, however, that Belgium consists of two different communities:
Although viewers in the Dutch-speaking community tend to watch
Dutch-language channels, viewers in the French-speaking community obvi-
ously prefer French-language channels. In the questionnaire, respondents
could select up to three channels (from a list of French or Dutch channels)
they prefer to watch regularly. Within the Dutch community, 35% of
respondents mentioned one of the VRT channels, the Flemish public broad-
casting corporation. Within the French community, only 16% preferred its
counterpart, RTBF. This is in line with what we know about the regular
audience of both broadcasting corporations (Table 5). Both variables were
measured by a dummy variable, expressing whether or not someone indi-
cated watching public=commercial television.
Including the preference for commercial or public broadcasting allows us
to develop full models, integrating the three dimensions we distinguished
(Step 3 in Table 3). We can observe significant negative effects for a prefer-
ence for commercial stations on political engagement and social movement
engagement. In contrast, the effect of a preference for public television is sig-
nificant only for political consumerism (Table 3). Taking channel preference
into account, however, only has a very limited effect on the overall explained
variance of the model.
To conclude, the models are most successful with regard to social move-
ment engagement. Here we demonstrate a negative relation with television
time and a preference for commercial stations. We also observe a positive
TABLE 5
Preference for Television Stations
Dutch community % French community %
Public television VRT (Een, Canvas,
Ketnet)
35.1 RTBF (La Une, La
Deux)
15.7
Commercial
channels
VTM, Kanaal2,
Vijftv, VT4,
Vitaya, Jim, TMF
93.3 RTL-TVI, PLUG
TV, AB3, AB4,
MCM
81.9
N 3,248 2,877
Note. Preference for television channels in Belgian Youth Survey 2006 (Hooghe et al., 2006).
Entries are column percentages. Note that respondents could indicate three channels, so that the
total percentage may be more than 100.
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relation, however, with news preference. The explained variance of the polit-
ical consumerism model is lower. Here we also observe a negative effect of
television time and a positive for news preference. Public broadcasting, too,
is positively associated with political consumerism. Finally, explained vari-
ance is lowest for the political engagement variable. Here there is no effect
of time, but we observe a positive effect of a news preference and a negative
one for commercial stations.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that not all relations proved to be equally significant, a clear
pattern does emerge, allowing a partial confirmation of our three hypoth-
eses. First, we observe a significant negative relation between television
viewing time and two out of three participation types, which is in line with
H1. Although most of the research on adults has failed to confirm the effect
of television viewing time, this effect was clearly observed among this sam-
ple of adolescents. One explanation might be that, for adolescents, the aver-
age weekday is highly standardized. Because compulsory schooling is
universal in Belgium, adolescents are typically at school from 8 a.m. to
about 4 p.m. On weekdays, their leisure time is therefore concentrated
between 4 p.m. and 10 p.m. During these hours, there is apparently a
trade-off between time spent watching television and time spent on various
forms of participation. Among adults, on the other hand, daily routines are
much less standardized, suggesting that the competition between television
and other forms of behavior might be less direct.5
With regard to program preference, H2 was partly confirmed, but in a
slightly different direction than expected. We did not find much evidence
for a negative impact of entertainment programs, but we did find evidence
for a positive impact of a preference for news. Although the effect of an
entertainment preference is usually negative or insignificant, a news prefer-
ence is associated with higher levels of participation, and this is the only
media use variable that is significantly related to all three forms of partici-
pation. In line with Prior’s argument, this would suggest that the main prob-
lem for engagement and participation is not that citizens watch
entertainment programs but rather that the time devoted to watching the
news could be declining among some media audiences.
5One could argue that most adults also have a standardized daily routine, but this will
mainly apply to those in full-time employment, which amounts to less than half of the adult
population. Among late adolescents, on the other hand, about 98% participates in full-time
schooling.
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For H3, results are similar. Although a preference for commercial
stations was negatively related to two forms of participation, we observed
a positive relation between public broadcasting and the third form of
participation.
The current analysis builds on a number of previous studies, but at the
same time it has a number of specific characteristics. With regard to validity,
it should be mentioned that this analysis was based on a representative sam-
ple of adolescents in a European country with a strong tradition of public
broadcasting. Previous studies have been conducted either among adults
or among a highly selective sample of adolescents. A first, sobering finding
for this age group is that information viewing is clearly not the main
activity. When questioned about their program preferences, only some
10% of respondents mention news and current affairs programs. This does
not mean they never watch television news: Most schools will try to encour-
age the habit of watching the television news in one way or another, but this
is clearly not the adolescents’ first preference. Their viewing habits seem lar-
gely determined by a preference for entertainment programs that is clearly
stronger than the preference for information. Adolescents also prefer com-
mercial stations, which are mentioned almost 3 times as often as public sta-
tions. Given these limitations, however, we can observe that the current
study supports most of the hypotheses, although the observed relations
are sometimes a little different than originally expected. We can conclude
that regular viewers participate less often, although there seems to be a posi-
tive relation between political participation and both a news preference and
a preference for public broadcasting. Thus, the negative assumptions about
the impact of television viewing are more strongly confirmed than in most of
the research among adults. Including all the other components of television
watching, we still find that television time as such has a significant negative
impact on participation levels. Although a news preference has a strong
positive effect on participation, it should be noted that studies by Prior
(2007) have shown that the percentage of viewers who regularly watch news
broadcasts has steadily declined, possibly weakening this effect at an aggre-
gate level. Self-evidently, this does not yet entail any claim about causality.
We can assume that exposure to television content is selective: Viewers who
are not interested in politics and=or public affairs will be less inclined to
expose themselves to political information, and they are clearly also less
likely to participate in political life. Whether or not the exposure to media
content has additional effects on participation is a research question that
can only be answered satisfactorily by relying on panel data.
Given the current state of research, it remains unclear what this implies
for the general claim about the impact of television on political partici-
pation. On one hand, it could be argued that adolescents are a very specific
TELEVISION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 637
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [K
.U
.L
eu
ve
n -
 T
ijd
sch
rif
ten
] a
t 1
1:1
6 0
9 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
1 
group. Their agency options are much more restricted than is the case
among adults: Their days are heavily scheduled by school requirements,
and they are also less autonomous in how they spend their leisure time
(e.g., with regard to mobility or finances). Simply watching television, there-
fore, might not always be a real choice for this group, but it could also serve
as a default option if other preferred activities cannot be pursued. An opti-
mistic assumption (which runs counter to the evidence presented by Prior,
however) could be that as this group progresses in the life cycle, their pro-
gram preferences will diversify, gradually including more news and current
affairs programs than is the case in this cross-sectional observation.
On the other hand, it must be noted that participation patterns tend to
be established quite early in the life cycle. Individuals who are already
active at age 16 generally continue to be involved when they grow older
(Hooghe, 2004). The fact that the negative relation between television
and participation can already be observed at this age could therefore imply
more negative long-term consequences for participation levels. The current
data do not allow us to disentangle these long-term consequences, as this
would require panel survey data that are not currently available, or at least
not for this age group. But what this study among adolescents demon-
strates is that there might be more reasons for concern than is acknowl-
edged in most of the current literature. Although it might be true that
television watching should be considered a multidimensional phenomenon,
and that programs and stations do have specific content and effects, the
overall negative relation between watching television and participation
levels can be clearly established among adolescents. Preferences for news
and for public broadcasting partly mitigate this negative relation, but they
fail to fully compensate for it.
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APPENDIX: DESCRIPTIVES
Missing M SD Minimum Maximum
Television viewing 44 3.253 0.929 1 5
Gender (0¼male, 1¼ female) 8 0.531 0.499 0 1
Citizenship status (1¼ yes) 20 0.937 0.244 0 1
Socioeconomic status 491 0.000 1.000 2.774 1.941
Political knowledge 0 2.673 2.874 0 10
Political interest 55 1.981 0.794 1 4
Political participation 347 0.000 1.000 0.835 12.759
Political consumerism 347 0.000 1.000 2.327 5.404
Civic participation 347 0.000 1.000 1.737 5.472
Music videos 53 0.548 0.498 0 1
Reality TV 54 0.125 0.331 0 1
Cartoons 55 0.181 0.385 0 1
Movies 51 0.800 0.400 0 1
Youth programs 54 0.165 0.371 0 1
Soap operas 55 0.240 0.427 0 1
Talk shows 55 0.057 0.231 0 1
News and current events 54 0.104 0.306 0 1
Game shows 54 0.118 0.323 0 1
Community shows 55 0.011 0.104 0 1
Lifestyle programs 55 0.107 0.309 0 1
Sports programs 56 0.271 0.445 0 1
Entertainment preference 56 0.875 .3305 0 1
News preference 54 0.104 0.306 0 1
Public broadcasting 65 0.263 0.440 0 1
Commercial stations 65 0.882 0.323 0 1
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